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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
Spatial Event Analysis Tool 
An application for mapping terrorist’s events 
 
 
 
by 
Gerald Leverich 
 
The Spatial Event Analysis Tool is an application to assist United States Army scenario 
developers who are charged with creating realistic and accurate settings, or story lines, 
for Army experimentation events. The application focuses on terrorist events reported in 
newspaper articles and are readily available on the internet. In the past, these reports have 
been overlooked because their locations are difficult to geocode in a GIS. However, when 
this information is structured, categorized, with even a general location, tremendous 
value will be derived through spatial analysis of terrorist events. In Army experiments, 
this allows for a temporal understanding of how and where terrorist organizations 
operate. It also aids in identifying trends in terrorist activities.  
For participants in Army experiments, the application can serve as a decision support tool 
that will aid in developing alternative methods to confront terrorist organizations. Most 
importantly it will allow experiment participants to study nontraditional problem sets 
with which the Army’s leadership is increasingly confronted.  
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 1. Introduction  
The advent of terrorism in the modern age has had an intense and far-reaching 
impact on the United States. This is especially evident in the U.S. Army, which 
has found itself in unique confrontations and in different roles because of the 
attacks on Washington D.C. and New York City, the resulting military actions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq as a part of the global war on terrorism. U.S. national policy 
regarding terrorism is clear in its mandate to take both proactive and reactive 
measures to ensure the safety of Americans both; overseas and within the United 
States. The United States Army has translated this mandate into changes in force 
structure, organization, equipment, training, and doctrine. Many of these changes 
have come about and will continue to come about because of experiments the 
United States Army has conducted. 
The goal of this project is to provide a realistic and accurate visualization of 
terrorist groups and the many events they conduct. The objective of the project is 
to spatially depict the activities of different terrorist organizations by means of 
generalized locations, like those locations one might find in a newspaper. The 
terrorist data must be rich in attribute information and be derived from newspaper 
or internet sources. Using GIS tools, the ultimate aim of this project is to 
demonstrate the identification of patterns and changes in the patterns of terrorist 
events. More specifically, this project intends to depict terrorist areas of 
operations, areas of terrorist influence, modus operandi (or how terrorist operate), 
and whether an organization’s area is growing over time. 
As alluded to before, United States Army has for many years conducted war games, 
simulations, and field exercises to evaluate emerging Army concepts, improve military 
capabilities and readiness, and lessen misgivings regarding potential threats it will face. 
Military experiments have gained renewed emphasis as the U.S. Army attempts to 
understand the modern terrorist threat. The results of such experiments aid in lessening 
surprise and allow the Army to develop doctrine, refine military training, and evaluate 
material solutions. Experiments require scenarios that allow for assessments and 
evaluations. Subsequently, “Military experimentation is a source of great competitive 
advantage…” (Krepinevich, 2000). 
Experimentation scenarios, whether contemporary or futuristic, display changing 
situations over time. When developing a scenario it is most important that it results in a 
realistic portrayal of the operational environment,  and that the scenario depict credible 
events (TRADOC, 2005).   
As the need for military experimentation increases, demand for detailed background for 
experimentation scenarios has reached an unprecedented level. The amount of 
information needed to adequately support an experiment is further complicated by the 
diversity of missions that the armed forces face. No longer is the military only concerned 
with conventional military tasks. There is a need to understand the makeup of social 
networks of different organizations and the forms they will take, particularly those of 
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terrorist groups. Just as important as the relationships among networked organizations are 
the identification of specific areas of operation and influence, ways of working, temporal, 
and spatial relationships of events credited to different organizations (Reed, 2007).  
1.1. Problem Statement 
The United States Army’s Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC’s) (2007) 
problem is “how to depict terrorist events for Army experiments.”  Presently, terrorist 
events are quantified in charts and graphs, clusters on a map board, or on Microsoft 
Power Point slides. TRADOC needs an approach to depict trends and allow analysis of 
terrorist events. Power Point presentations place a tremendous load on the scenario 
writers and lack the depth and realism or allow for the analysis that experiments need. 
TRADOC also needs to be able to replicate intelligence reports in their scenarios. 
Because such experiments include participants from academia, business, and allied 
militaries, intelligence reporting in scenarios is often precluded. That is because of the 
classified nature of military reporting. Newspaper articles and internet sources can be 
used to depict terrorist events, however, event analysis derived from newspaper reporting 
and other internet sources has been overlooked since these sources lack specific 
coordinates or locations. Much can, in fact be inferred from events, even if specific 
locations are not known. TRADOC recognizes the benefits of using newspaper and 
internet sources to add realism to their scenarios. Despite the wealth of information 
available from newspapers and the internet, TRADOC is unsure how to use these reports 
spatially. 
1.2. Client 
TRADOC’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) is the executive agent for 
the creation of scenarios for all Army experiments and training events. In order to 
develop realistic scenarios for TRADOC, the DCSINT requires a geographic information 
system (GIS) application that visually portrays actual events based on newspaper articles 
or data sources available on the internet. TRADOC also requires application that will 
permit the analysis of these events to determine where and how terrorist organizations are 
operating. 
1.3. Client Expectations 
The client requires an application for use primarily by scenario developers and 
experiment participants. While initially focused on terrorist events in the Philippines, this 
application must be readily expandable to accommodate terrorist groups from other 
countries. The application also requires a database that combines geographic and terrorist 
event information.  Finally, the application will be used to assist in answering 
information requests from event participants within a specified time frame.   
A wealth of geographic and detailed terrorist event information is required to ensure an 
accurate and realistic scenario.  This data must be entirely unclassified while remaining 
relevant to challenges that the U.S. Army will face now and in the future (Wilson, 2006).  
Geographic features should include, but are not limited to, the items shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1.  Feature Type Examples 
Feature Type Example 
Transportation Infrastructure Roads, Highways, Waterways, Railways 
Geographic Information Elevation, Contours, Island Boundaries 
Geographic Names Administrative Codes, Place Names 
Administrative and Political 
Boundaries National, Province, Municipalities 
Populated Places Cities, Towns, Refugee Camps 
Energy Infrastructure Power Plants, Power Sub-Stations, Refineries, 
Pipelines, Power Distribution Networks 
Communications Infrastructure Radio Stations, Television Stations, Newspaper 
Publishers, Cellular Towers 
Transportation Choke Points Tunnels, Bridges, Dams 
In order to achieve their expectations, the client recommends terrorist event point data 
that is detailed and includes: who was responsible for the event, the ideology of the 
group; a targeted facility or victim; attack type; casualties of the event; and a city name 
for the location of the event. 
The terrorist data combined with the geographic information must answer some of the 
following spatial questions for exercise participants in response to a scenario information 
requirement. Examples of scenario information requirements include: 
• Determine the culpability of an unattributed terrorist event. 
• Is there an increase or decrease in terrorist events over a period of time? 
• Determine the modus operandi of a terrorist organization. 
• Determine the greatest threat of an assortment of terrorist organizations. 
• What is the likely target of a terrorist organization: victim type, facility, or 
location? 
• Is there an increase or decrease in a terrorist’s area of operations (AO) 
over time based on terrorist events? 
• Is there a relationship between activities of a terrorist organization and the 
organization’s ideology? 
• Which terrorist group is the deadliest? What group conducts the most 
attacks? 
• Is there a correlation between a terrorist group and its attack type, target, 
or tactic?  
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These scenario information requirements directly relate to one of the nine generic spatial 
and temporal questions:  
• “Where is?” 
• “What is at location?”  
• “What is the spatial relation to?” 
•  “What is in a particular spatial relationship to?” 
•  “What is similar to?” 
•  “Where has occurred?” 
•  “What has changed since?” 
•  “What will change if?” 
•  “What spatial pattern(s) exist(s) and where are anomalies?” 
(Egenhofer & Kuhn, 1999).   
 
1.4. Proposed Solution 
A geographic information system that allows for analysis of spatially referenced data is 
required to meet TRADOC’s needs. The GIS will allow for spatial analysis, and rely on a 
database that is derived from open source data, such as information that comes from 
newspapers or the internet. A tool that can geolocate generalized locations, such as those 
found in open sources, also needs to be explored.  If required, modifications can be made 
to the GIS to facilitate ease of use.  The application, designated the Spatial Event 
Analysis Tool (SEAT), will depict terrorist events and add realism to military scenarios. 
The tool can analyze events conducted by different terrorist organizations and in different 
locations. By portraying events over time, the tool will demonstrate increasing or 
decreasing activity of a terrorist organization. It can also show whether a terrorist group’s 
area is expanding over time and whether there is a relationship between different terrorist 
organizations operating in the same area.   
The data and locations used by the SEAT will be derived from open source reporting 
sources. The generalized location of the event will then be cross referenced with a 
gazetteer in order to geolocate the event and make it usable within the tool. Once these 
events are geolocated, a subsequent analysis of event clusters will allow for a 
determination of where and how a terrorist organization operates.  
Other approaches were evaluated as part of this solution to determine if they were 
applicable to terrorist events analysis. Most notably, techniques used by the law 
enforcement community were explored in order to determine their usability in analyzing 
terrorist events.   
The result of these efforts will be a SEAT which will provide the military client with a 
dimension of military experiment scenarios that has been sorely missing.  
  
2. Background and Literature Review 
There have been attempts to integrate terrorist events into TRADOC scenarios under the 
guidance of TRADOC regulations. However, while these regulations are relatively 
general and descriptive as they pertain to what an experiment and supporting scenario are 
meant to accomplish. They are not clear as far as scenario mediums and specific problem 
sets or locations that scenarios should replicate because they do not reflect a thorough 
understanding of terrorism by the U.S Army (Betts, 1982).   
Until recently, the Army has relied on outdated manuals for an explanation of how 
terrorist operate. These manuals also tend to concentrate on the similarities of terrorist 
groups, and not on the uniqueness of different groups. U.S. Army manuals also tend to 
highlight how to counter terrorist groups and not how these groups operate. Until 
recently, these counterterrorism efforts were based on the U.S. Army’s experience in the 
Vietnam War in the 1960s (Aylwin-Foster & Army, 2005).  
The recent integration of terrorist events in scenarios has been done mostly by foreign 
militaries that face the threat of terrorism. One example is a model developed by the 
British during their intervention in Northern Ireland in the late 1970’s (Campbell & 
Connolly, 2003 ). While this model is applicable, it too is dated. Even recent publications 
tend to highlight dated organizations, rather than modern day terrorist organizations. The 
recent Spanish study, The Production of Terrorist Violence: Analyzing Target Selection 
Within the IRA and ETA (de la Calle, Sánchez-Cuenca, & Instituto Juan March de 
Estudios e, 2006) highlights the tactics of European terrorist organizations from the 
1970s. The only country that appears to have had constant and recent experience with 
terrorism is Israel. While insights can also be gleaned from their experience, each 
terrorist group has different goals and operates differently (Aylwin-Foster & Army, 
2005). 
Terrorism is a renewed, but unique problem set that the United States Army has struggled 
with for some time. The military has been stuck in conventional wisdom. Conventional 
wisdom in the Army is that the U.S. Army is meant to conquer and defend against other 
armies. Terrorist organizations are different from national armies as they and their 
organizations do not represent recognized governments, as do conventional armies and 
their governments. Because of this, terrorist organizations and more specifically the 
events they conduct have been limited in integration of U.S. Army scenarios and 
experiments.  
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2.1. Terrorism Background 
Terrorism is a form of unconventional and psychological warfare. The word is politically 
and emotionally charged, especially since September 11th, 2001 in the United States. The 
word "terrorism" was first used in reference to the Reign of Terror during the French 
Revolution (see Figure 1). While the history of terrorism goes back centuries it is often 
overlooked because terrorist events have not appeared with equal intensity and there have 
been frequent periods of time relatively free of terrorism. As a result, when terrorism 
reappeared after a period of relative calm, there was a tendency to regard it as a new 
phenomenon, without precedent (W. Laqueur, 2001). 
Figure 1. French Reign of Terror  (O'Kane, 1991). 
Supporting Laqueur’s assertion, modern terrorism is identified from the end of the 
Second World War to the beginning of the twenty-first century. The modern history of 
terrorism is subsequently divided into three types of terrorist conflict: terrorism in the 
service of national liberation and ethnic separatism; left-wing terrorism; and Islamist 
terrorism.  
These three types of terrorist conflict are important to the U.S. Army because the Army’s 
involvement in conflicts since 1975 has been limited to small-scale wars. These types of 
terrorist conflict were seen, but not necessarily experienced by the Army. Left wing 
terrorism was prominent in the 1970s, primarily in Europe and South America, but the 
US. Army was not used against these threats. An example of terrorism in the service of 
national liberation and ethnic separatism was the conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s, but 
this type of terrorism was targeted at different ethnicities in Bosnia, and not against the 
U.S. Army. The Irish and British conflict in Northern Ireland is also an example of 
terrorism in the service of national liberation and ethnic separation. Islamist terrorism has 
been active in the Middle East since the 1980s, and at times the U.S. military has been the 
target of this type of terrorism, but it wasn’t until September 11, 2001 and the subsequent 
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq that the U.S. military has been used in a large scale, 
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against terrorism. On the other hand, the Israeli Army, has significant experience with 
Islamist terrorism, even before that country’s birth in 1948, as Israel has been the target 
of most Islamists (Shughart, 2006). 
Because of lack of recent experience combating terrorism, the confrontation with 
terrorism poses a significant challenge to the Army. The U.S. military has struggled to 
adapt to combating terrorism, which is seen as protracted, insurgent-type warfare. 
America’s affinity for high-tech conventional conflict and quick, kinetic, unilateral 
solutions that avoid direct contact with the local populace has slowed its response to this 
complex form of conflict (Wilson, 2006).  
2.1.1. Key Characteristics of a Terrorist Event 
Official definitions of what constitutes terrorism are used by nations to determine 
counterterrorism policy. Unfortunately, definitions are often developed to serve policy. 
Most government definitions outline the following key criteria or characteristics when 
determining whether an event constitutes simple crime or is a terrorist attack: target, 
objective, motive, perpetrator, and legitimacy or legality of the act. Terrorism is also 
often recognizable by a claim of responsibility from the perpetrators (ADL, 2004). 
Nevertheless, a number of characteristics are indicative of terrorist events. 
Violence – According to Walter Laqueur of the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, "the only general characteristic of terrorism generally agreed upon is that 
terrorism involves violence and the threat of violence." However, the criteria of violence 
alone do not produce a useful definition, as it includes many acts not usually considered 
terrorism: war, riot, organized crime, or even a simple assault. Property destruction that 
does not endanger life is not usually considered a violent crime (Walter Laqueur, 2003). 
Psychological impact and fear – The terrorist attack or event is carried out in such a way 
as to maximize the severity and length of the psychological impact. Each act of terrorism 
is a performance devised to have an impact on a large audience. Terrorists also attack 
symbolic targets to show their power and to shake the foundation of the country or 
society to which they are opposed. This may negatively affect a government's legitimacy, 
while increasing the legitimacy of the given terrorist organization and/or ideology behind 
a terrorist act (Juergensmeyer, 2000). 
Perpetrated for a political goal – Something all terrorist attacks have in common is their 
political purpose. Unlike letter writing or protesting, terrorism is a political tactic used by 
activists when they believe no other means will effect the kind of change they desire. The 
change is desired so badly that failure is seen as a worse outcome than the death of 
civilians. This is often where the interrelationship between terrorism and religion occurs. 
For example, when a political struggle is integrated into the framework of a religious or 
cosmic (Juergensmeyer, 2000) struggle, such as the control of an ancestral homeland or 
holy sites like Israel and Jerusalem. Additionally, failing in a political goal (nationalism) 
becomes equated with spiritual failure. For the highly committed, it is worse than their 
own death or the deaths of innocent civilians (Walter Laqueur, 2005). 
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Deliberate targeting of non-combatants – It is commonly held that the distinctive nature 
of terrorism lies in its intentional and specific selection of civilians as direct targets. The 
criminal intent is shown when babies, children, mothers, and the elderly are murdered or 
injured, and put in harm's way. The victims of terrorism are often targeted not because 
they are threats but because they are specific "symbols, tools, animals or corrupt beings" 
that tie into the terrorists specific view of the world. The victim suffering accomplishes 
the terrorists' goals of instilling fear, getting a message out to an audience, or otherwise 
accomplishing their often radical religious and political ends (Juergensmeyer, 2000). 
Disguise – Terrorists almost invariably pretend to be noncombatants, hide among 
noncombatants, fight from in the midst of noncombatants, and when they can, strive to 
mislead and provoke the government soldiers into attacking the wrong people. When an 
enemy is identifiable as a combatant, the word terrorism is rarely used (FBI, 1999). 
Unlawfulness or illegitimacy – Some official definitions of terrorism, notably 
government, add a criterion of illegitimacy or unlawfulness (FBI, 1999) to distinguish 
between actions authorized by a legitimate government (and thus lawful), and those of 
other actors, including individuals and small groups. Using these criterion, actions that 
would otherwise qualify as terrorism would not be considered terrorism if they were 
government-sanctioned. For example, firebombing a city, which is designed to affect 
civilian support for a cause, would not be considered terrorism if it were authorized by a 
legitimate government. These criterions are inherently problematic and are not 
universally accepted, because: it denies the existence of state terrorism. The same act 
may or may not be classed as terrorism depending on whether its sponsorship is traced to 
a legitimate government; "legitimacy" and "lawfulness" are subjective, depending on the 
perspective of one government or another, and they diverge from the historically 
accepted meaning and origin of the term. For these reasons these criterion are not 
universally accepted. Most dictionary definitions of the term do not include these 
criterion (Walter Laqueur, 2003). 
2.1.2. Terrorism Defined 
An internationally accepted definition of terrorism has remained elusive. The United 
Nations has attempted to gain consensus for a definition since the organization’s 
inception. The lack of consensus actually predates the United Nations and was also a 
major challenge to the League of Nations as far back as the 1930s (U.N., 2008).   
A 1988 study by the US Army found that over 100 definitions of the word "terrorism" 
have been used (Record, 2003).  In many countries acts of terrorism are legally 
distinguished from criminal acts done for other purposes, and "terrorism" is defined by 
statute  (Hoffman, 1998). This greatly compounds the difficulty of providing a precise 
definition. The United Nations, and United States, definitions of terrorism are indicated 
as following: 
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 United Nations Definition of Terrorism: 
“…We affirm that the targeting and deliberate killing of civilians and non-combatants 
cannot be justified or legitimized by any cause or grievance, and we declare that any 
action intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, 
when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or 
to compel a government or an international organization to carry out or to abstain from 
any act cannot be justified on any grounds and constitutes an act of terrorism…” (United 
Nations Proposal on Terrorism, 2005) 
United States Definition of Terrorism: 
“...the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or 
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of 
political or social objectives.” (United States Federal Code and the United States Federal 
Bureau of Investigations, 2001) 
2.2. Military Experimentation & Scenario Background 
TRADOC is responsible for conducting experiments and war games to evaluate military 
fighting concepts, new weapon systems, military organization designs, operational plans, 
and how to improve soldier effectiveness on the battlefield. Experiments are normally 
conducted under specific scenarios, which provide a framework that allows for the 
assessment of capabilities of U.S. forces and equipment under specified situations. They 
also identify strengths and weakness, as well as potential improvements and changes to 
the Army (TRADOC, 2005). An experiment should also explore the potential 
possibilities of what the future may hold for the environment and the military. See Table 
2 for examples of concepts that have proven their value through experiments 
(Krepinevich, 2000). 
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 Table 2.  Unbelievables (Cerf & Navasky, 1984).  
Notable Quote Source 
"This 'telephone' has too many 
shortcomings to be seriously considered as a 
means of communication. The device is 
inherently of no value to us." 
 
Western Union internal memo, 1876. 
 
"The wireless music box has no imaginable 
commercial value. Who would pay for a 
message sent to nobody in particular?" 
 
David Sarnoff’'s associates in response to his 
urgings for investment in the radio in the 1920s. 
 
"Heavier-than-air flying machines are 
impossible." 
 
Lord Kelvin, president, Royal Society, 1895. 
 
"Airplanes are interesting toys but of no 
military value." 
 
Marechal Ferdinand Foch, Professor of Strategy, 
Ecole Superieure de Guerre 
“Has there ever been danger of war between 
Germany and ourselves, members of the 
same Teutonic race? Never has it even been 
imagined”. 
 
 
Andrew Carnegie, 1913 
“This so-called war is nothing but about 
twenty-five people and propaganda” 
 
Arthur Vandenberg, U.S. Senator from 
Michigan, 1939 
“If God had wanted a Panama Canal, he 
would have put one here” 
 
King Philip II of Spain, c. 1552 
“Defeat of Germany means defeat of 
Japan, probably without firing a shot or 
losing a life.” 
 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1942 
2.2.1. Scenario Characteristics 
A good scenario must be realistic and portray appropriate forces on real terrain within an 
expected operational environment (USJFCOM, 2007). A scenario derived from a defense 
planning scenario (DPS) is inherently considered realistic. Military forces and equipment 
that are portrayed in future scenarios are derived from defense budget projections. All 
aspects of the experiment must be reasonable. As DPS derived scenarios are thoroughly 
vetted by the defense community, the scenario is treated as reasonable and logical 
(TRADOC, 2005).   
The scenario must be robust and reusable. The scenario should stress the concept that is 
being evaluated. A “measurement space” allows for the assessment of the capabilities of 
doctrinal concepts, tactics, forces and weapons systems. It also allows for comparisons of 
different approaches or alternatives. Scenarios should be usable for many studies. This 
requires that the scenario be well documented, adequately staffed and it should garner the 
appropriate approval for its use (TRADOC, 2005). 
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2.2.2. Scenario Types 
Depending on what is to be evaluated, TRADOC has many different types of scenarios to 
choose from. Besides the concept that is to be evaluated, different scenarios may require 
different levels of coordination, validation and approval. The different types of scenarios 
include: operational scenario, which can be either standard or non standard, a study 
scenario; a dynamic scenario; and a vignette (TRADOC, 2005). 
Operational scenario - An operational scenario is a graphic and narrative portrayal of a 
future hypothetical conflict. It is thorough and includes all aspects that influence an 
experiment. An operational scenario describes all aspects of a conflict; before, during, 
and after. It does not include military forces alone, but also the social, political, 
economic, and geographic considerations of a region or area. All aspects of the 
environment are considered, including threat, friendly and non aligned forces, and people 
or cultures (TRADOC, 2005). 
Standard operational scenario – TRADOC’s standardized operational scenarios 
are derived from defense planning scenarios (DPS). DPS are developed at the 
Department of Defense level and are considered the most standard of operational 
scenarios. These scenarios are rigorously developed, exhaustively coordinated among the 
defense industry and different military service; Air Force, Navy and Marines. Standard 
operational scenarios validated among all Army agencies and their senior leaders 
(TRADOC, 2005). 
Nonstandard operational scenario – Nonstandard scenarios are not derived from DPS 
scenarios but developed to test a concept that is outside of a time period where a current 
policy or concept exists. Nonstandard scenarios are developed to meet the unique needs 
of the Army alone (TRADOC, 2005). 
Study scenario – A study scenario is developed for modeling, simulation, or gaming 
purposes. A study scenario is usually derived from a DPS scenario and is not 
significantly different from an operational scenario other than it is applied to an 
electronic medium. A study scenario may not be as comprehensive as an operational 
scenario, but meets the needs of the tested or challenged concept (TRADOC, 2005). 
Dynamic scenario – A dynamic scenario is open-ended. It is derived from either an 
operational or study scenario, but free play is anticipated. The purpose of the scenario is 
not to arrive at a predetermined outcome and game play is expected to arrive at an 
unforeseen result. A dynamic scenario provides the greatest challenge to scenario 
developers as the developer must be prepared for any potential event or direction that free 
play may take the experiment (TRADOC, 2005). 
Vignette – A vignette is a study or operational scenario focused on a specific period or 
location. Vignettes are very focused and do not include all of the considerations that a full 
operational scenario may include. Vignettes are scenarios developed for a limited scope, 
time, or location. Vignettes are usually very restrictive and constrained (TRADOC, 
2005). 
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2.3. Literature Review 
While there are few academic dissertations addressing the spatial aspects and analysis of 
terrorist events, there are some similar concepts that may be adopted. Most notably this 
section intends to address the similarities between terrorist and criminal events and how 
law enforcement addresses crime analysis. Because the data used in this study is 
derivational, a critical review of the consequences of using data from newspaper 
reporting and from internet will also be discussed. The final portion of this literature 
review will provide a brief review of spatial statistics and their potential applications in 
terrorist event analysis.  
2.3.1. Terrorist Event Analysis and Similarities to Crime Event Analysis 
While little work has been published concerning the spatial aspect of terrorist events, 
criminal event analysis suggests that much can be gained through the spatial visualization 
of terrorist events. By visualizing spatial density, the changes of events over space and 
time, as well as activities of terrorist organizations, decision makers will be informed as 
to how best to  allocate counter terrorism resources, define a defense posture for counter 
terrorism forces, and identify measures for protecting civil infrastructures and 
populations (Memon & Larsen, 2006).   
While, the study of terrorist events has fallen under the domain of criminal analysis there 
are many differences in the motivations of terrorists versus criminals. According to Xu & 
Chen, the analysis of criminal events can result in predictions. Terrorist events can also 
lead to predictions of further violent activity, but these preparatory events usually go 
unreported in the press. Therefore, the value of terrorist event analysis will lie in 
quantifying trends instead of predicting subsequent events. Xu & Chen also point out that 
event analysis is by nature an after the fact approach to analyzing terrorist organizations. 
Unlike petty criminal events, criminal network analysis such as that of organized crime 
groups and gangs requires the ability to integrate information from multiple crime 
incidents and different sources in order to realize trends and patterns about the structure, 
organization, and its operations. Xu & Chen also address the challenges of the veracity of 
reporting used as data in criminal event analysis. The accuracy of data is a significant 
challenge for identifying trends of criminal events and interdicting social networks, such 
as a criminal organization. These challenges may not be important to understanding 
where and how an organization operates, but challenges may affect the fidelity of 
predictions, especially if exact location information such as an address or grid 
coordinates are not provided. 
While understanding social networks and conducting event analysis has been practiced 
by law enforcement for many years, it has not been formally acknowledged by the U.S. 
military. The main inhibitor to military acceptance of this approach lies in the different 
restrictions that affect law enforcement and military forces. Law enforcement approaches 
information in terms of evidence that will stand up in a U.S court. The military looks at 
information in terms of trends and intelligence where a degree of conjecture may be 
required.  As an example of this, Krebs (2002) states “analyzing networks after an event 
is fairly easy for prosecution purposes. Mapping covert networks to prevent criminal 
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activity (events) is much more difficult…” There is much to be realized by the military by 
doing exactly what Krebs states. Doing it spatially and temporally with modern 
automated tools, however, adds dimensions that will inform in a way that has not been 
previously considered. Approaching terrorist events in the same way that law 
enforcement approaches criminal events will allow for the identification of where and 
how terrorist organizations operate, much in the same law enforcement determines how 
and where organized criminal groups and street gangs operate, based on the activity 
(events) they conduct. 
As the military prepares for a period of persistent conflict in which there is a greater 
potential for terrorist threats (Casey, 2007),  greater emphasis is being placed on the 
Army to  understand social networks like terrorist groups. Specifically, emphasis is being 
placed on where, how, and why terrorist groups operate. The answers to these questions 
can be derived from the event a terrorist group conducts. While Reed recognizes that old 
approaches are no longer applicable to modern terrorist threats, existing methods and 
tools from other domains may provide tremendous value (Reed, 2007). For example the 
National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center's Crime Mapping and 
Analysis Program’s, Crime Analysis Spatial Extension (CASE), provides the ability to 
analyze criminal events with a nearest neighbor, a standard deviation and sequencing 
function for spatial information of criminal events (CMAP, 2008).  Integrating event 
analysis as part of understanding social networks during Army experiments, and 
subsequently during operations, will certainly inform the where and how of social 
networks such as terrorist 
organizations. 
 While few approaches to terrorist 
event analysis have been explored, 
many approaches are readily 
available within the law enforcement 
domain. Other methods, such as 
CASE and  non-military approaches 
like those in this study have 
application and are relevant outside 
of their traditional domain needs 
recognition. Although the 
completeness of information is 
particularly stringent for law 
enforcement, it is not always the case 
for the military. The fact that an event 
occurred may be enough, as long as it 
can be classified and a location 
established. As a result of this 
literature review many similarities 
have been identified between terrorist 
organizations and organized crime 
groups and gangs; examples of covert networks that share common traits and conduct 
Figure 2. Criminal Event Analysis (Grubesic, 2001) 
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similar activities. Events conducted by terrorist groups may cluster in a similar way that 
crime events cluster. This allows approaches to terrorist events in a similar manner that 
law enforcement uses for criminal events (see Figure 2). A set of classifications can be 
developed to assist in grouping the different aspects of an event in order to arrive at a 
conclusion regarding the significance of a group of events. As an example, one would be 
able to determine if a terrorist area of operation is growing or condensing. Recognizing 
that events reported in newspapers do not have the same degree of specificity required by 
law enforcement purposes, press reporting does have a factual aspect to it. From a law 
enforcement perspective, visualization of events from newspaper reporting can be 
informative, and while but it will not allow for predictions in the same way that Grubesic  
(2001) envisions it, it can predict some aspects of terrorist events. Alternative approachs 
such as those used by law enforcement to cluster events may prove useful.  
2.3.2. Open Source Data 
Since the data used in this application is derived from open sources, such as the internet 
and newspaper reports, the data will require a critical review. Factual accuracy of an 
event requires where an event occurred, what the event was, and who carried the event 
out. Because much of this information is derived from newspapers, an objective 
evaluation of the details of an event must be determined. “Journalists rarely have the 
resources or access to penetrate their sources' informational worlds to establish facts 
independently” (Ericson, 1998, p. 83).   
However, by relying on multiple reporting sources one can come to realize that an event 
occurred, a spatial proximity of where that event occurred, what that event was, and 
possibly, who claimed responsibility for the event. This information can be derived from 
civilian press reporting and responsibility for the event can be determined by the 
reporting source, i.e. a police or government official.  
David Noble recognizes that there is much value from the use of open source information 
“However, because the accuracy of this open source information varies widely, the 
Figure 3. The Fusion Process  (Noble, 2004) 
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correctness of the information needs to be assessed before it can be used reliably” (2004). 
Historically, this correctness of information was analyzed objectively by experts who 
could then determine the validity of the information based on their long-standing study of 
the information. Noble suggests in this age of technology and advanced information 
systems, much of this evaluation can now be done by computers. This approach however, 
is outside of the scope of this study. As an alternative, Noble does suggest the reliance of 
data that has already been validated by an institution, and is subsequently cross-
referenced with other information in order to increase the data’s reliability. Noble’s 
fusion process is highlighted in Figure 3 (Noble, 2004). 
2.3.2 Spatial Analysis and Statistics 
Spatial analysis or spatial statistics contain many of the formal techniques which study 
entities using their topological, geometric, or geographic properties. It is the use of 
location to identify trends and potential prediction of terrorist events. Different methods 
are used for point pattern analysis and polygon data. According to O'Sullivan & Unwin 
(2002), point pattern analysis can describe patterns of locations of point events and test 
whether there is a significant occurrence of clustering of points in a particular area. In 
order to conduct point pattern analysis, data must meet five important criteria: 
 
• The pattern must be mapped on a plane, meaning that it will need both latitude 
and longitude coordinates. 
• A study area must be selected and determined prior to the analysis. 
• The Point Data should not be a selected sample, but rather the entire set of sought 
for analysis. 
• There should be a one-to-one correspondence between objects in the study area 
and events in the pattern. 
• Points must be true incidents with real spatial coordinates. For example, using the 
centroids of a census tract would not be a useful process.   
Once the point data meet these five criteria, there are various methods that we can use to 
analyze the point pattern, including quadrant count method, kernel density estimation, 
and distance-based approaches. Among these techniques, quadrant count and kernel 
density estimation can help detect the spatial first-order effect (the intensity of the event 
distribution in the study area), while other distance-based methods, such as nearest 
neighbor distance and L function are often used to identify spatial second-order effects 
(the interdependence of the events or the spatial autocorrelation of the events). 
Spatial autocorrelation is also often present in the attributes of lattice data. For example, 
median household income across counties in California could be correlated. This reflects 
a fundamental concept in geography that nearby things are often more similar than things 
which are far apart (Tobler, 1976). To quantify the spatial autocorrelation of areal data, 
there are various measures developed which includes Moran’s I, Geary’s C, and, local 
indicators of spatial association (LISA) have been extensively discussed in the literature 
(Getis and Ord, 1992; Bailey & Gatrell, 1995; Anselin, 1995). Although these measures 
work directly on the attributes of area objects, it is also feasible to apply this measure to 
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point data by aggregating it to certain areal units. However, modifiable area unit problem 
(MAUP) may present when aggregating events to lattice unit. 
Although spatial statistical analysis has been well discussed in literature, the application 
to terrorist events is rare. Aldenderfer & Blashfield (1984) suggest that clustering events 
is useful in developing a scheme for grouping entities. The authors propose that clusters 
of objects or events are a viable method for creating multiple classifications for a single 
event. The clustering of terrorist events by target, method, time and location will assist in 
classifying events, and will subsequently allow the determination of a terrorist 
organization’s characteristic patterns and style of attack.  
Aldenderfer & Blashfield (1984) caution that this approach to classification is relatively 
simple, but it will not evaluate why something happens, and is not as statistically 
supported as factor analysis might be. Cluster analysis is a relatively simple method for 
classifications and has historically been used by the law enforcement community to 
understand organized crime networks and gangs. Because of similarities among 
networked organizations such as crime groups and gangs, terrorist organization should 
not be much different.  
In summary, this project intends to demonstrate that through the use of spatial analysis 
and clustering techniques, patterns and trends of terrorist events can be realized. That this 
can be done with information derived from newspapers and internet sources will not only 
meet the client’s requirements. The study will also demonstrate that precise locations of 
terrorist events are not necessary in order to visualize how terrorist groups operate and 
better inform decision makers. 
  
3. Study Area and Data 
 This section describes the study area for this project, the Philippines, as well as some of 
the unique considerations of the data that were used to recreate the terrorist events there. 
All data used for this study was derived from open sources and is readily available on the 
available on the internet. The following section presents a brief overview of the 
geography of the Philippines. Additionally,  based on the definitions defined in the 
previous section a description of  the major and some minor terrorist organizations that 
operate in the Philippines is discussed. 
3.1. Background of Study Area 
The Philippine Islands are located in the western Pacific Ocean, and consist of over 7107 
separate islands. The islands are commonly divided into three groups, as depicted in 
Figure 4; the Luzon Islands are in the north, and the central Visayas Islands and 
Mindanao Islands are in the south. The total land area of the country is 116, 000 square 
miles and it shares maritime boundaries with Malaysia, Indonesia, China, Taiwan and 
Vietnam. The capital is the port city Manila and the country is administratively divided 
into 80 provincial areas. The population of the country is 76.5 million people (GOP, 
2008).  
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The Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States in 1898 as a result of the Spanish 
American war and the nation remained under American control until the Japanese 
invaded the island chain in 1941. The United States subsequently liberated the 
Philippines from the Japanese at the end of World War II. The Philippines were granted 
independence in 1946. Since then the Philippine nation has had a continual history of 
insurrection, as well as Muslim resistance to the country’s non-Muslim, Catholic majority 
rule. The most severe revolt occurred in the 1970s when a massive Islamic rebellion 
broke out, and while the major Islamic groups have since brokered truces with the 
Philippine government, conflict continues (Niksch, 2003). 
Figure 4. The Philippine Islands
 
The Philippines is one of the many fronts in the United States’ global war on terrorism. 
The Philippines is a strong political, economic and, military ally of the United States. The 
Philippines is considered a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally, and 
annually conducts military exercises with the United States military, even though the 
military relationship has been  controversial to the people of  the Philippines (ADL, 
2004). 
Today, there are four major terrorist groups active in the Philippines: the Moro National 
Liberation Front, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the Abu Sayyaf, and the New 
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People's Army. The first three are Islamic groups that operate primarily in the southern 
islands where most of the country's Muslim minority live. The Communist New People's 
Army operates in the northern Philippines and is considered an anarchist group. There are 
at least four other terrorist groups operating in the Philippines, but these are considered 
splinter or break away groups from the major four groups indicated above. At least one 
transnational terrorist group is also active in the Philippines; The Indonesian Jemaah 
Islamiyah, which operates throughout Southeast Asia (ADL, 2004). 
3.1.1. Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 
Emerging in the early 1970s, the MNLF sought an independent Islamic nation of all 
Filipino islands where a sizeable Muslim population was present. In 1996, the MNLF 
signed a peace agreement with Manila that created the Autonomous Region of Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM), an area composed of two mainland provinces and three island 
Figure 5. Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
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provinces, in which the predominantly Muslim population enjoys a degree of self-rule. 
The area controlled by the ARMM is depicted in Figure 5.  
MNLF chairman and founder Nur Misuari was installed as the region's governor, but his 
rule ended in violence when he led a failed uprising against the Philippine government in 
November of 2001. He is currently in jail and MNLF leader Parouk Hussin took over as 
ARMM governor in 2002. Nur Misuari reportedly still has a small band of followers who 
remain actively opposed to the current arrangement (ADL, 2004). 
3.1.2. Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
As the largest Islamic extremist group in the Philippines, the 
MILF split from the MNLF in 1977 and continues to wage war 
against Manila. Headed by Islamic cleric Salamat Hashim, the 
MILF seeks a separate Islamic state in the southern Philippines. 
Hashim is depicted in Figure 6. Although the MILF signed a 
peace agreement with Manila in 2001, MILF-sponsored violence 
has continued. Manila accuses the MILF of responsibility for the 
March 2003 Davao City airport bombing that killed 21 people, 
and for harboring members of the small militant Pentagon gang 
accused of kidnapping foreigners in recent years (ADL, 2004). 
The MILF has an estimated 12,000 members.  
3.1.3. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)  
The smallest, most active and most violent Islamic separatist 
group in the southern Philippines is Abu Sayyaf (Bearer of the 
Sword). The group emerged in 1991 as a splinter group of the MNLF. Its founder, 
Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, was a veteran of the Islamic mujahideen movement in 
Afghanistan and was killed in a clash with Philippine police in 1998. ASG's current head 
is thought to be Janjalani's younger brother Khadafi Janjalani. The flag of ASG is 
depicted in Figure 7 (ADL, 2004).  
Figure 6. Salamat 
Hashim, Leader of the 
MILF (BBC, 2006). 
Abu Sayyaf engages in kidnappings, 
bombings, assassinations, and extortion from 
businesses and wealthy businessmen. Most of 
its activities are centered in the southern 
island of Mindanao, but in recent years the 
group has broadened its reach. In April of 
2000, ASG kidnapped 21 people, including 1
foreign tourists, from a resort in Malaysia and 
in a separate incident, abducted several 
foreign journalists and an American citizen. In 
May of 2001 Abu Sayyaf kidnapped 20 
people from a resort island in the Philippines 
and murdered several of the hostages, 
0 
including American citizen Guillermo Sobero. In June of 2002 U.S.-trained Philippine 
Figure 7. Flag of the Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG) (Rogers, 2004). 
 32
commandos tried to rescue three hostages being held by Abu Sayyaf on Basilan Island. 
Two of the hostages, including American citizen Martin Burnham, were killed in the 
resulting shootout. Philippine authorities believe that the ASG had a role in the Octob
2002 bombing near a Philippine military base in Zamboanga that killed three Filipinos 
and a U.S. service member. In February of 2004 Abu Sayyaf claimed responsibility for 
Philippine ferry fire, but at this writing, Philippine authorities doubted the claim (ADL, 
2004). 
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3.1.4. New People's Army (NPA) 
The NPA is the military wing of the Communist People's Party of the Philippines (CPP). 
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police chief, and blowing up a mobile telec , 
kidnappings. Both the MNLF and MILF condemn Abu Sayyaf's activities. Philipp
forces have apprehended a number of Abu Sayyaf terrorists. Most recently, in Decemb
of 2003, Philippine soldiers captured senior Abu Sayyaf commander Ghalib Andang, 
a.k.a. Commander Robot. Andang is suspected of involvement in the April 2000 
kidnapping of Western tourists in Malaysia (ADL, 2004).  
cadre of several hundred active fighters and about 1,000 supporters.  
Founded in 1969 with the aim of overthrowing the Philippines government through 
guerrilla warfare, the NPA strongly opposes the U.S. military presence in the Philipp
and publicly expressed its intent to target U.S. personnel in the Philippines in January 
2002, warning that any American troops who enter their stronghold areas will be 
considered legitimate targets. The flag for NPA is depicted in Figure 8. The NPA 
primarily targets Philippine security forces, politicians, judges, government inform
and former NPA rebels. The NPA's founder, Jose Maria Sison, lives in self-imposed exi
in the Netherlands and reportedly directs 
operations from there (ADL, 2004).  
settlement with the NPA but peace talks 
between the Communist Peoples Party 
(CPP), the political arm of the NPA, and
Philippine government stalled in June of 
2001 after the NPA admitted killing a 
Filipino congressional representative. I
eptember of 2002, the NPA claimed 
responsibility for assassinating a mayo
attacking a police station, and killing the 
ommunications transmission station (ADL
2004).  
Figure 8. Flag of the New People's Army 
(Jones, 1989) 
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The NPA derives most of its funding from supporters in the Philippines and Europe and 
from so-called revolutionary taxes extorted from local businesses. Together, the 
CPP/NPA has an estimated strength of over 10,000 members.  
3.1.5. Other Terrorist Groups 
Other terrorists groups are occasionally active; however these groups are considered to be 
splinter groups derived from one of the main terrorist groups. The strength of these other 
terrorist organizations is considered small and is exemplified by the small number of 
events that these groups have conducted. These smaller, splinter groups are depicted in 
Table 3. 
Table 3. Terrorist Splinter Groups 
Philippines Splinter Groups 
Original Group Splinter Organization 
NPA Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB) 
ASG Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM)
MILF The Pentagon Group 
NPA Peoples liberation army (HMB) 
Philippine 
Military Bungkatol Liberation Front 
3.1.6. International Support to Terrorism 
All the Islamic groups reportedly have links with international terrorism, particularly with 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Al Qaeda. The MILF is suspected of training JI members at 
MILF training camps in the southern Philippines.  
It is suspected that early funding and organizational support 
of Abu Sayyaf was provided by Osama Bin Laden associate 
and brother-in- law Muhammad Jamal Khalifa. In 1997, the 
U.S. State Department designated Abu Sayyaf a foreign 
terrorist organization (ADL, 2004).  
In January 2002, Filipino police arrested Indonesian Islamic 
extremist Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi, depicted in Figure 9. 
Al-Ghozi is a self-confessed member of Jemaah Islamiyah 
and an Al Qaeda explosives expert.  
Following his arrest, Ghozi led Filipino authorities to a large 
cache of arms and explosives in Mindanao and told a 
Filipino court that he planned to use the explosives for jihad 
attacks in Asia. He was sentenced to 17 years in prison. In 
July 2003, Al-Ghozi escaped from prison and in October 
Figure 9. Fathur Rohman 
Al-Ghozi (Rogers, 2004). 
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2003, Philippine forces tracked him down and killed him. In November 2003, the 
Philippines arrested Taufik Rifki, who reportedly admitted he was the financier for a 
Jemaah Islamiyah training camp in the southern Philippines (ADL, 2004).  
Most recently, in February 2004, Filipino Jaybe Ofrasio, was arrested in Belfast, 
Northern Ireland, and charged with funneling money to JI.  
The U.S. designated the CPP/NPA a foreign terrorist organization in August 2002, and 
listed NPA founder Jose Maria Sison as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). 
Authorities in the Netherlands froze assets in his bank accounts there and cut off his 
social benefits (ADL, 2004). 
3.2. Data Source and Quality 
As a prerequisite all data used for this study was derived from open source information; 
data that is available to the public and attainable without charge on the internet. For this 
study, the point data for the terrorist events, Philippine geographic data, and reference 
data that would allow the correlation of a generalized city name to a coordinate system 
are required. Because an objective analysis of data is beyond the scope of this study, the 
data was acquired from reputable organizations that have pre evaluated the data. 
All data first had to be converted into tabular form. In most cases this was accomplished 
by importing the data into Microsoft Excel data sheets. The exception was the Place 
Names data, because Microsoft Excel 2003 is not capable of accepting more than 64,000 
rows of data, however, Microsoft Excel 2007 is able to read this amount of data. 
Unfortunately, ArcMap 9.2 is not compatible with it. This ESRI incompatibility was 
resolved with the release of ArcMap 9.3, but to facilitate data preparation, Place Name 
data was simply imported as a Microsoft Access 2003 table. 
3.2.1. Terrorist Event Data 
Originally, the terrorist event data used for this study was to be derived from the 
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT). Their data for the Philippines 
included 329 different terrorist events that occurred in the Philippines from 1991 to 2007.  
An example of the MIPT data sheet is depicted in Appendix 2.  
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The information that MIPT used and included in their database was provided by the Rand 
Corporation. The data provided by MIPT  was primarily considered because it was the 
same information used for a previous TRADOC spatial project conducted by Mark 
Covey on social networks of terrorist groups (Covey, 2007). Unfortunately, MIPT lost 
their contract to publish and maintain terrorist data on the internet, so an alternative data 
source had to be found. 
Figure 10.  NCTC Web Site (NCTC, 2008)
An alternate data source was identified at the National Counter Terrorism Center’s 
(NCTC) web site  (see Figure 10) (NCTC, 2008).  The NCTC’s World Wide Incident 
Tracking System (WITS) maintains a comprehensive global terrorist event database. Six 
hundred and seventy four terrorist events were recorded in the Philippines between 2004 
and 2007. The data from NCTC’s WITS database was actually more detailed than the 
data that was considered from MIPT.  
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Figure 11 depicts the WITS web interface. To be included in the database, terrorists 
groups must have initiated and executed an event such as failed or foiled attacks, as well 
as hoaxes, are not included in the database. Spontaneous hate crimes without intent to 
cause mass casualties were excluded to the greatest extent practicable. While genocidal 
events can be interpreted as the most extreme form of politically motivated violence 
against civilians, attacks in this category were excluded, in part because of the inherent 
difficulty in counting such events and because the inevitable undercount does not do 
justice to the scope and depth of such atrocities. A cause and effect of the event cannot be 
determined strictly by the data that is kept by WITS (NCTC, 2008). 
Figure 11. WITS Web Interface (NCTC, 2008).
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3.2.1. Philippines Geographic Data 
Geographic data for the Philippines was acquired from Geo Community, 
(GeoCommunity, 2008) and the features included in the data are listed in Table 4.  
Table 4. Philippines Data 
Feature Type Example 
Transportation Infrastructure Roads, Highways, Waterways, Railways 
Geographic Information Elevation, Contours, Island Boundaries 
Geographic Names Administrative Codes, Place Names 
Administrative and Political 
Boundaries National, Province, Municipalities 
Although the data from Geo Community contains useful information, it was not 
originally projected and did not have a datum. The common geographic datum for the 
Philippines is the Luzon 1911 datum. However, because this project would eventually be 
part of a global project encompassing many other countries besides the Philippines, it was 
decided to use the Worldwide Geodetic System (WGS) of 1984. Additionally, the 
Universe Transverse Mercator (UTM) was chosen as a global projection, instead of the 
Philippines Transverse Mercator (PTM). The Philippines falls in UTM Zones, 50, 51, and 
52 north. The difference between PTM and UTM is depicted in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12. Comparison of UTM and PTM Zones (SANREM, 2004). 
 38
3.2.2. Place Name Data 
One of the central tasks involved in this project is to geocode the terrorist events 
locations, and therefore a data set that contains place names and their coordinates is 
required. There were three sources evaluated for place name data. The first is the Geo 
Community (GeoCommunity, 2008), which provides data for the GIS industry. The 
second data is from Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC), which 
provides gridded population and urban areas data (SEDAC, 2008). The third choice was 
the GEOnet Names Server (GNS) (NGA, 2008) which  provides access to the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's (NGA) and the U.S. Board on Geographic Names 
database of foreign geographic feature names.  
The first two options, from Geo Community and SEDAC, were not as comprehensive as 
the data available from GNS. The veracity of the GNS data is considered more complete 
as the information is developed by NGA and vetted by the U.S. Board on Geographic 
Names database of foreign geographic feature names.  
The data from GNS for the Philippines includes over 73,000 city and place names for the 
country. The GNS data includes Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM), 
Longitude/Latitude, and Philippine local coordinates for all place names in their database. 
The GNS data also provides an update date. An example of the GNS data is provided in 
Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. GNS Web Page (NGA, 2008). 
  
 39

4. Methods 
This section focuses on the major methods that were applied in the project for data 
manipulation and spatial analysis. The most significant efforts explored include the 
approaches for geocoding, or the ability for mapping data based solely on a city name, 
aggregation of point data into polygons, and the development of a geodatabase. In 
addition, relevant spatial statistical methods for identifying spatial patterns in the data 
will also be introduced in this section. 
O’Sullivan & Unwin (2002) recognized that using geographic information analysis and 
spatial statistics to support a study might be challenging as “geographic information 
analysis is not yet an established discipline.” They identified through their own research 
that the literature in the community has at least four different contexts for the term 
“geographic information analysis.” The context that the term “geographic information 
analysis” is used is different for geographers, the statistic community, technicians and the 
modeling community. 
For the purpose of this study, an array of the terms will be used including spatial data 
manipulation, which is the process to make data useful, spatial data analysis, that will 
describe an exploratory approach to the data, and spatial statistical analysis, which is used 
to interrogate the data, and assist in arriving at finding. For this study, the term, spatial 
modeling, which involves constructing models to arrive at outcomes, will not be used as 
it is outside the scope of this project (O'Sullivan & Unwin, 2002). 
 
4.1. Geocoding Approaches 
Geocoding is the process of finding associated geographic coordinates often expressed as 
latitude and longitude, from geographic text data, such as street addresses, zip codes or, 
in the case of this project, city names. The features can be mapped with geographic 
coordinates and entered into a geographic information system. Of the utmost importance 
in geocoding is the standardization of names, variants and, associated data (NGA, 2008). 
This section will discuss some of the exploratory methods that were used in attempting to 
geocode information for the Philippines. Three distinct geocoding methods were 
explored: conducting a spatial relate (from relates and joins); the usage of MetaCarta 
tools; and geocoding with ArcView’s Address Locator. The spatial relate was quickly 
discounted as there were too many place names from the terrorist event data and too great 
a potential for spelling differences. 
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Figure 14. MetaCarta Tool Kit (MetaCarta, 2008). 
An exploratory effort was made with a MetaCarta-derived tool kit. The tool kit was 
procured from the government and is very similar to the commercial version of the 
MetaCarta application. MetaCarta’s products make data and unstructured content 
"location-aware" (MetaCarta, 2008). The tools are quite easy to use, very accurate, and 
not prone to the spelling issues that a spatial relate has. MetaCarta relies on an internet 
connection and the tool will subsequently search for a place name from an online 
gazetteer. The place name is then returned and graphically plotted in ArcMap. However, 
extracting the information from the tool in ArcMap and using the data in a geodatabase 
was not possible with the version of the tool that was provided. An example of the Meta 
Carta tool kit is depicted in Figure 14. 
The final method explored, and subsequently used for the project, was ArcCatalog’s 
address locator. An address locator is a dataset in ArcGIS that stores the address 
attributes, associated indexes, and rules that define the process for translating nonspatial 
descriptions of places, such as city names, into spatial data that can be displayed as 
features on a map. An address locator contains a snapshot of the reference data used for 
geocoding, and parameters for standardizing addresses, searching for match locations, 
and creating output (Kennedy, 2001).  
Unfortunately, a Philippine address locator does not exist. What was subsequently 
required was the tailoring of the standard address locator that is included in ArcCatalog 
from its set City/State data requirement to the Philippines City/Province data set. The 
address locator tool easily accepted this translation once it was structured in the place 
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name data. The only problem encountered was that the GNS data did not include a 
province code for its province field. The issue with province codes was overcome by 
adding an ADM code from GNS’s lookup table. The ADM code was subsequently 
appended to the place name data and a 95% parse rate (640 records) was achieved with 
the address locator and modified GNS place name data. The remaining 5% of the 674 
terrorist events were then manually parsed. An example of the modified address locator 
tool is depicted in Figure 15. 
  
Figure 15.  Address Locator 
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4.2. Point Data Aggregation 
While point data was acquired, some of the statistical analysis required the aggregation of 
point data to achieve polygons. Aggregation of data further enhanced visualization since 
the smallest reporting area for a terrorist event is at the city level and with point data 
many times events overlapped each other. For example, from the point data view, only 
one event is depicted in Quezon City, Manila, but the single symbol actually hides eleven 
other events, for a total of twelve events (see Figure 16).  
Figure 16. Point Data Example 
 
Subsequently, aggregation of point data was achieved by conducting a spatial join in 
ArcMap. The spatial join tool that was used to aggregate the terrorist event points within 
provincial boundaries as depicted in Figure 17. Aggregation of events was conducted 
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against provincial boundaries of the Philippines in order to gain a join count, or how 
many terrorist events occur within a province. By doing this, further analysis could be 
conducted at the provincial level.  
 
 
Figure 17. Spatial Join Example 
Figure 18 depicts the results of the spatial join. The result of this join provides polygons 
with multiple attributes from the original point data. 
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 Figure 18. Point Data Aggregation
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4.3. Geodatabase Design 
A geodatabase is designed to store, query, and manipulate geographic information and 
spatial data and is also known as a spatial database. Within a spatial database, spatial data 
is treated as any other data type. Vector data can be stored as point, line or polygon data 
types and may have an associated spatial reference system. A geodatabase record can use 
a geometry data type to represent the location of an object in the physical world and other 
standard database data types to store the object's associated attributes (Arctur & Zeiler, 
2004).  
The conceptual design behind the geodatabase for the Spatial Event Analysis Tool 
emanates from the actions that a terrorist takes to conduct an attack or event. Replicating 
the different fields of an action, in this case a terrorist event is a challenging undertaking. 
However, replication of an event is the sole intention of the geodatabase that supports the 
Spatial Event Analysis Tool. The conceptual design for the geodatabase is depicted in 
Figure 19. 
The intent of the conceptual design is to consider the relationships among the many 
aspects of a terrorist event. In the abstract, all relationships emanate from the event itself. 
Figure 19. Conceptual Database Design 
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An event occurs somewhere, and subsequently has a locational position. Normally, the 
location is defined as a street address or grid coordinate. For this project, the location is a 
city name. 
A terrorist organization carries out an event. The terrorist organization has a goal in mind 
when carrying out a terrorist event and the actions of the attack. For example, an Islamic 
terrorist organization may have a goal of demonstrating Islamic justice for a social 
discrimination, slight, or perceived injustice. One commonality of all terrorist events, 
regardless of the goal is that the event must be spectacular and garner attention. A 
terrorist event is not successful if it does not intimidate or terrorize, and that will not 
occur if the event doe not garner attention. 
The terrorist attack can be carried out by one or more terrorist organizations but those 
organizations must share a common goal. Terrorist organizations may form alliances of 
convenience, but ultimately any slight differences in goals will cause friction amongst 
terrorist organizations that cooperate. Additionally, it is not uncommon for terrorist 
organizations to combat each other. This is because like a terrorist group may have a 
disagreement with the government, a terrorist organization can also have a disagreement 
with other terrorist organizations. Usually, this is because of conflicting goals among 
terrorist organizations. For example Islamic groups, which are religious, generally 
conflict with communist organizations, which are political. That is because communist 
organizations generally do not recognize religion, while religious organizations do not 
recognize modern politics. Conflict can also occur between different sects of a religion, 
such as what occurred in Iraq between the Sunni and Shia sects of Islam. 
A terrorist organization has members, or individual terrorists. The individual terrorist is 
bonded to the organization by the goal of the organization. The terrorist organization 
requires multiple individual terrorist. The individual terrorists carry out different roles 
and functions for the terrorist organization. Roles that individual terrorist may have are 
bomb maker, a security specialist, a trainer, supporter or even a spokesperson. While it is 
possible that one terrorist maybe a member of multiple terrorist organizations, this is 
becoming increasingly rare. 
The last aspect of the conceptual database is the tactic. Terrorists and their organization 
carry out an attack with different tactics. A tactic used during a terrorist attack can be 
unique and be the signature of a particular terrorist organization. For example, Islamic 
terrorist organizations tend to rely on suicide bombing tactics. The tactic also supports the 
goal of the terrorist organization. Extending the example of the suicide bombing, a tactic 
that is reinforced  by the religious concept of martyrdom, figures prominently in religion 
and subsequently the religious goals of terrorist organizations. 
In an attempt to model these many facets of a terrorist event an analysis of past events 
was conducted and modeled in a Unified Modeling Language (UML) diagram, depicted 
in Figure 19. The UML that was developed was used for the Terrorist Event database 
conceptual design and subsequently as the basis for the Spatial Event Analysis Tool’s geo 
database. 
 48
The main database for the Spatial Event Analysis Tool, the Terrorist Event Database, is 
derived from the National Counter Terrorism Center’s (NCTC) World Wide Incident 
Tracking System (WITS), for terrorist events in the Philippines. The NCTC leads the 
U.S. efforts to chronicle and combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the 
terrorist threat, sharing that information with partners, and integrating all instruments of 
national power to ensure unity of effort.  
From the individual WITS event data sheets many fields were used to populate a file 
geodatabase for spatial analysis. An example of the WITS data sheet is depicted in Figure 
20. 
 
Figure 20. WITS Data Event Datasheet (NCTC, 2008) 
The terrorist event table is one of the main components of the SEAT geodatabse. The 
tabular data is part of the file database that is used for spatial analysis. While not limited 
to only the following, terrorist event table includes the minimum fields: 
• Incident date 
• Event Type 
• Weapon Used 
• City and State of the Event 
• Victim Information 
• Facility Information 
• Characteristic 
• An Event Summary 
A subsequent spreadsheet was developed from these eight minimum fields of the 674 
terrorist events that have occurred in the Philippines between 2004 and 2007. This 
terrorist event spreadsheet allows for the creation of over 18 other fields that describe the 
characteristics of a terrorist event. An example of the Terrorist Event Spreadsheet is 
depicted in Figure 21.  
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The spreadsheet provided point data, down to the city level of terrorist events in the 
Philippines. The spreadsheet was subsequently imported into a Microsoft Access where a 
*.dbf table was created that could be imported into a file geodatabase. Besides the 
imported data, the table and geodatabase will allow for the further population of events 
that occur after 2007. Additionally, relationships will be established within the database 
in order to allow for complex queries. These queries will be developed based on the 
client’s requirements for spatial, temporal, and predictive analysis.  
Figure 21. Terrorist Event Spreadsheet 
Additional reference data is included in the file geodatabase, and including administrative 
boundaries such as cities, municipalities, provinces, country borders, and islands. Point 
and line feature classes are included in order to depict transportation nodes for reference 
purposes. This information is exclusively in vector format. The resulting products from 
the analysis, as well as the geocoding tools, are all stored within the geodatabase.  
After these considerations for data sources, as well as the conceptual design for the 
terrorist events database, the subsequent logical database design was implemented and is 
depicted in Figure 22. 
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 Figure 22. Spatial Event Analysis Geodatabase 
The logical database design is a furtherance of the initial conceptual design. However, 
from the initial concept a technical solution was created, in this case a set of tables as 
well as other data sets.  
The first consideration was given to the terrorist events, annotated as number 1 in Figure 
22. The table that was developed was extracted from the NCTC data that was previously 
mentioned. That data was structured and placed into multiple rows and columns of a table 
in order to meet the objectives of the conceptual design, those columns and rows were 
previously discussed in Figure 21. All aspects of the concept were included within the 
terrorist event table. 
The next solution was developed for location information. As previously discussed 
location data was derived from NGA. However, the challenge arose because of the 
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hierarchal nature of locations. For example a city is  a location, a city is within a 
province, a province is within region or zone, and regions or zones are part of a country. 
Because of this hierarchal nature of locations, multiple related tables were required, and 
they are depicted by the number 2, in Figure 22. Number two of the logical design, 
directly relates to the Location class of the conceptual design (Figure 19). 
The third aspect of the location information that had to be related was the geocoding of a 
grid location and a city name. This was accomplished using ArcMap’s geocoding tool 
and was ubsequently exported to a table, depicted by number three of Figure 22. The 
table contained over 74,000 city names and locations for all of the Philippines. The table 
also includes multiple grid coordinates for each location based on different projections 
that may be encountered in the Philippines. 
The last aspect for consideration was reference data. Reference data was assembled into 
four major Feature datasets and is depicted by number four, in Figure 22. Those 
Philippine datasets included Administrative Boundaries, Hydrology Features, 
City/Regions, and Transportation Features. All feature classes within the datasets were 
either line or polygon features. Reference data was already pre structured and and no 
table were specially constructed for the data.  
Location data, instrumental for geocoding, was almost exclusively derived from tabular 
data. These three tables were developed and paired with relationship classes in order to 
establish the hierarchal nature of a location. The hierarchal nature of administrative 
boundaries for the Philippines is depicted in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23. Admin Boundaries Hierarchy 
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For the Philippines, the barangay is similar to a United States city, a municipality is 
similar to a U.S. county, province is similar to a state, and region is similar to a U.S. 
region, such as the southwestern United States. Because of this hierarchy nature of 
administrative boundaries, relationship classes were developed within the geodatabase. It 
also constituted three tables to construct administrative boundaries. 
The Terrorist Event data, as well as the final geocoding information, was also derived 
from tabular data. Two additional sets of point features and one annotation feature for 
labeling were also included in the geodatabase.  
Tabular data used in the Spatial Event Analysis Tool is exclusively for location 
information and to depict terrorist events. Fields in the TerroristEvent table define the 
characteristics of a terrorist event, while fields for GeoCodeTotal provide the coordinates 
for locational data. PHL_RegionCode identifies the different geographic features of the 
Philippines, as well as the features name and where it is located. A description of the 
tabular data can be found in Table 5. 
Table 5. Tabular data 
Table Name Field Name Field Data Description 
TerroristEvents Associated Group The terrorist group believed to be responsible for the attack 
TerroristEvents Facility_type The facility that was attacked 
TerroristEvents Victim_type The victim that was attacked 
TerroristEvents Tactic How the terrorist attacked 
TerroristEvents Weapon What weapon the terrorist used 
TerroristEvents Casualties Compilation of deaths and wounded as a result of the attack 
GeoCodeTotal Lat/Long Common Latitude and longitude  
GeoCodeTotal MGRS Military UTM coordinate 
GeoCodeTotal ADM Province code 
GeoCodeTotal JOG The map sheet for the point 
PHL_RegionCode F_DESIG Geographic feature type 
The database for the SEAT is kept in the first normal form (1NF) as relations are 
established in the database and there are no duplicate rows. 1NF is used primarily 
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because the SEAT is a prototype effort, and data requirements are not too extensive. The 
purpose of normalization is to restrict the possibility of update, insertion, and update 
anomalies. However, in the future, when the SEAT is expanded and includes multiple 
countries and many different terrorist organizations normalization will be critical (Kent, 
1983). 
The database can easily be placed in second normal form (2NF). 2NF requires that the 
data first be placed in 1NF, and one of the non-prime attributes of the table are 
functionally dependent on a part (proper subset) of a candidate key. For example, within 
the terrorist group table, there may be dependencies based on the ideology table (Kent, 
1983). 
To place the data in third normal form (3NF) requiresThe table must be in 2NF and every 
non-key attribute must be non-transitively dependent on the primary key. All attributes 
must rely only on the primary key. So, if a database has a table with columns Terrorist, 
Terrorist Organization, Country, and Province, it is not in 3NF. This is because the 
terrorist relies on a terrorist organization. Therefore, for it to be in 3NF, there must be a 
second table with terrorist organization and terrorist member columns; the country 
column would be removed (Kent, 1983). 
Placing the data in fourth normal form (4NF) occurs only if, for every one of its non-
trivial multivalued dependencies is a superkey. For example, if you can have two phone 
numbers values and two email address values of a terrorist, then you should not have 
them in the same table (Kent, 1983). 
The preferred normalization is fifth normalization (5NF). To be in 5NF the table must be 
in 4NF and there must be no non-trivial join dependencies that do not follow from the 
key constraints. A 4NF table is said to be in the 5NF, if and only if, every join 
dependency in it is implied by the candidate key (Kent, 1983). 
4.4. Spatial Statistical Analyses 
Various spatial statistical techniques have been well developed to identify spatial patterns 
of the geographic data and investigate the relationships among geographic variables. 
Some of the common spatial statistical methods have been implemented in current GIS 
software including, ArcGIS, which greatly facilitates spatial manipulation and analysis in 
one platform. In this project, the analysis focus was on the spatial and temporal patterns 
of terrorist events. Pattern identification in geographical analysis can be performed on 
both point data and polygon data. In the former situation, the interests lies in the presence 
of spatial randomness of location of events, while the interest focuses on the presence of 
the spatial randomness of attributes of the polygons in the latter case. For instance, cluster 
analysis may be conducted in order to better understand locations of crimes, or the 
outbreak of certain diseases to better see whether there is a pattern. In both of these cases, 
point pattern analysis can be of great help to institutions and policymakers in their 
decisions on how to best allocate their scarce resources to different areas. Corresponding 
to these two examples, hotspot analysis may be conducted to examine the spatial 
autocorrelation of crime rates and disease rate if they are aggregated to polygon level, 
 54
such as census tracts, cities, or in this case provinces. A number of methods were used in 
this project, to analyze terrorist events including nearest neighbor, global and local spatial 
auto correlation, and kernel density exploration. All of these analytical methods were 
conducted using ArcMap’s Spatial Analysis tool set. 
4.4.1. Nearest Neighbor Distance  
The nearest neighbor distance is one method of determining the point pattern based on 
the average nearest neighbor distance (NND) among events. The nearest neighbor 
distance for an event in a point is the distance from that event to the nearest event also in 
the point pattern. A clustered point pattern is expected to have a shorter NND, while a 
dispersed pattern will have greater NND. (O'Sullivan & Unwin, 2002). 
 
Figure 24. Nearest Neighbor Tool 
 ArcMap also includes the ability to conduct an average of nearest neighbor analysis. 
This ability is included in the Terrorist Event Analysis toolbar of the Spatial Event 
Analysis Tool. The NND toolbar is depicted in Figure 24. Further NND methods that can 
be used include the G, F, and K functions. 
4.4.2. Global and Local Spatial Autocorrelation  
Spatial autocorrelation indicates that data from locations near one another in space are 
more likely to be similar than data from locations remote from one another. This is 
indicative of the first law of geography, or Tobler’s First Law. According to O'Sullivan & 
Unwin (2002), if spatial autocorrelation were not commonplace, geographic analysis 
would be of little interest and if geography is worth studying at all, it must be because 
phenomena, such as terrorist events, do not vary randomly through space.  
Based on the conduct of spatial autocorrelation, there are three general outcomes; 
positive autocorrelation, negative autocorrelation, and noncorrelation. With spatial 
autocorrelation, it is then possible conduct diagnostic measures to determine the degree 
of autocorrelation. Methods that can be used to determine the degree of spatial 
autocorrelation include Moran’s I, join count statistic, and Geary’s C.  
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The most common method of spatial autocorrelation is Moran’s I which possesses a 
unique ability to conduct both global and local analysis. Global spatial analysis or global 
spatial autocorrelation analysis yields only one statistic to summarize the whole study 
area. In other words, global analysis assumes homogeneity. If that assumption does not 
hold, then having only one statistic does not make sense as the statistic should differ over 
space (Anselin, 1995). 
However, if there is no global autocorrelation or no clustering, we can still find clusters at 
a local level using local spatial autocorrelation. The fact that Moran's I is a summation of 
individual cross products is exploited by the local indicators of spatial auto correlation 
(LISA)  to evaluate the clustering in those individual units by calculating Local Moran's I 
for each spatial unit and evaluating the statistical significance for each I (Anselin, 1995) 
Spatial autocorrelation is conducted in ArcMap’s ArcToolbox with either the Spatial 
Autocorrelation (Moran’s I) or the Cluster and Outlier Analysis tools (Anselin Local 
Moran’s I). Both of these tools are depicted in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25. Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran's I) 
4.4.3. Kernel Density 
The kernel density method counts the incidents in an area (a kernel), centered at the 
location where the estimate is made. This analysis is a partitioning technique, meaning 
that incidents are partitioned into a number of different clusters. The user is often able to 
specify the number of clusters. In some forms of this analysis, all incidents, even the 
outliers, are assigned to one and only one group. However, other techniques allow for a 
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form of clumping analysis, where there are groups that have overlapping membership 
(Burden, 2003). 
The kernel density method is very good for analyzing the point patterns to discover 
potential hot spots. Kernel density is extensively used by criminal event analysts to 
determine high crime areas. This method provides a useful link to geographical data 
because it is able to transform data into a density surface.The choice of  the kernel 
bandwidth, strongly affects the density surface. Additionally, kernel density can weight 
these patterns with other data, such as density of populations and or unemployment rates. 
In ArcMap, kernel density surface is created with the kernel density tool bar as depicted 
in Figure 26. 
 
 57
 
Figure 26. Kernel Density Toolbar 
 
  

5. System Development 
Based on the data and methods that are described in Sections 3 and 4, this section 
illustrates how the Spatial Event Analysis Tool was implemented as a GIS application. 
Subsequently, discussion is given to system functional and non-functional requirements, 
the hardware and software design, and customization of interface that was required in 
order to meet the client’s requirements. 
5.1. System Requirements 
The establishment of system requirements was a critical part of this project’s design, 
especially because of the exploratory nature of the endeavor. While the author has 
extensive knowledge of the domain (terrorist analysis), the author was not as 
knowledgeable regarding GIS. Constant coordination between the client and author was 
required in order to bridge this gap. 
The system requirements below are divided into functional requirements that relate to 
specific functions that the SEAT must perform and non-functional requirements that 
include features, characteristics, and constraints that either define a satisfactory system or 
set forth criteria that could be used to judge the operation of the SEAT. 
5.1.1. Functional Requirements 
After discussions with TRADOC, some basic functional requirements of the tool were 
identified. Coordination with the client continued throughout the life cycle of the project 
in order to quickly identify or refine any of the client’s functional requirements. Based on 
discussions with the client, the below listed functional requirements were considered 
during the design of the Spatial Event Analysis Tool. 
• The application’s main interface should be that of a commercial-off-the-
shelf program 
• Based on events, the application must display the most recent terrorist area 
of operations. 
• The application must be easy to use and include specific toolbar and/or a 
toolbox. 
• The application must contain data on Philippine indigenous terrorist 
groups. 
• The data used in this application must be derived from open sources. 
• The application will attempt to provide for predictive analysis of terrorist 
events, such as what is a terrorist group’s likely target, victim type, 
facility, or location. 
• Based on operating location and unique methods of an organization, the 
application must allow for the determination of culpability of an 
unattributed terrorist event. 
• The application can be used for the determination of a modus operandi of 
a terrorist organization. 
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• The application will demonstrate spatial increase or decrease in a 
terrorist’s Area of Operations (AO) over time, based on terrorist events. 
• The system will assist in determining the ideology of an organization, 
based on where they operate.  
• The application must provide a means for querying the data by time, event 
type, location. 
• A means for adding additional events to the database, from newspapers or 
other sources must be included. 
• The application shall allow users to geocode events. 
• The application will depict symbols based on terrorist events that are 
derived from military standards. 
• The application will include a gazetteer. 
 
Additionally, a Functional Requirements identifier and tracking number were developed 
and are included in Appendix B 
5.1.2. Nonfunctional Requirements  
Only a few specific nonfunctional requirements have been identified. Overall, the 
application will be a professional looking system, and perform effortlessly. These 
nonfunctional requirements were discussed and agreed upon with TRADOC. Below, the 
following nonfunctional requirements are worth mentioning: 
• The application must be based on Microsoft XP Operating System. 
• The application must be easy to use. 
• The application will operate in an unsecure environment. 
• The application should require minimal training in order to operate. 
• The application should be easy to maintain with software updates and 
patches. 
• The database that supports this system must be able to be expanded to 
include data for other countries in the future. 
• The system must allow for portability. 
• The system must be reusable. 
The system requires minimal effort in order to place it into operation. 
5.2. System Description 
Based on the requirements articulated in the previous sections, the resulting system can 
best be described as a system that integrates hardware, software, and open source data for 
capturing, managing, analyzing, and displaying all forms of geographically referenced 
information; primarily that information; primarily that information which pertains to 
terrorist events.   
The purpose of the architecture of the Spatial Event Analysis Tool is to simplify any 
infrastructure requirements for the client. The system relies heavily on commercial-off-
the shelf-software (COTS) and operates as a standalone computer. The simple 
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architecture developed for this application will allow for easy familiarity, minimal 
training, portability, and minimum maintenance. 
 
Figure 27. System Archetecture 
 
The architecture of the Spatial Event Analysis Tool is depicted in Figure 27. The system 
resides within the Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI’S) geographic 
information system (GIS), ArcMap. The system allows for the input of multiple types of 
data as shown in the left column in Figure 27. The data is subsequently organized within 
the geodatabase as described in Section 4.3 to provide for editing, queries, manipulation, 
geolocating, and analysis of the data. Spatial analysis is performed with a number of 
modified tools that are built in ArcMap. The subsequent analysis using these tools will 
result in either hard copy map output or multimedia projection. Additionally, all of this 
information will be simultaneously documented. 
5.2.1. Hardware Design 
Hardware requirements supporting the system are fairly standard for today’s personal 
computers. Since the system relies on a modified version of ArcMap 9.3, those 
recommended system requirements include:  Intel Pentium 4, 1.6 MHz or better 
processor; 2.4 gigabits of disk space; 2 gigabits of ram; a video card with 256 or better 
color and a resolution of 1024 x 768 or better, with a 24-bit capable graphics accelerator. 
The system needs to run in the Window XP operating system, which is print capable. 
 61
5.2.2. Software Design 
As mentioned above, the Spatial Event Analysis Tool resides within ESRI’s ArcMap 9.3. 
The geodatabase will also rely on other ESRI products, most notably ArcCatalog. A 
toolbox for spatial analysis was developed within ArcMap. These tools allow for the 
graphical depiction of terrorist events, as well as some of the trend analyze. Some of 
these tools, such as buffers, are simple and will allow for visualization and the 
identification of terrorist areas of operation. Others are more complex and attempt to 
address some of the predictive analysis requirements of the application. The tool box will 
be built using ArcMap’s customizable interface.  
5.2.3. Interface Customization 
In an effort to meet the client’s requirement for ease of use, the normal ArcMap interface 
will be modified in an effort to facilitate ease of use. This will include removal of all of 
ArcMap’s tool boxes and extraneous options. With the exception of designed tools, 
ArcMap’s interface will be sterile and include only minimal buttons and functions 
necessary for the conduct of terrorist event analysis. 
Table 6. Terrorist Event Tools 
Since minimal buttons 
and functions are 
displayed on the 
ArcMap interface, it 
is necessary to 
include two 
specialized tool bars. 
One is Terrorist 
Analysis Tools and 
the other is the 
Terrorist Event Tools. 
The Terrorist Event Toolbar includes the ability find features, places, and route locations. 
Functions of the Terrorist Event Toolbar are depicted in Table 6.  
Terrorist Event  Tools 
Tool  Function 
Find  Find Features, Find Place, Find City, Find Province 
Zoom In  Zoom into Location 
Zoom Out  Zoom out of Location 
Pan  Move Map Area 
Data View  View All Layers, and Data 
Layout 
View  Print View 
Print  Print 
The other toolbar, the Terrorist 
Analysis Tools, serves as a query 
tool bar and also allows for 
temporal analysis. The Terrorist 
Analysis Tool is built 
specifically for the Philippines 
and allows queries by terrorist 
group or Philippine province. 
The toolbar also allows for 
queries by year and the ability to 
Figure 28. Terrorist Analysis Tool
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select or unselect by attribute. The Terrorist Analysis Tool also allows for the 
construction of maps. The Terrorist Analysis Tool is depicted in Figure 28. 
The subsequent layout, with Make Map example and the Terrorist Analysis and Terrorist 
Event toolbars, are depicted in Figure 29. 
  
Figure 29.  "Make Map" Example 
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6. Analysis Results 
This section will focus on the outcome of the many approaches that were used for 
visualization and identification of patterns of the terrorist event data. All of the tools that 
were used for the pattern analysis were resident in the off-the-shelf ArcMap program and 
were described in Sections four and five. Because the dataset contains very rich attribute 
information on terrorist events, various types of analyses can be performed to address 
different issues or questions. To demonstrate the usefulness of the spatial analytical tools 
that were included in the system, this section will use examples to show how to apply 
them and what substantive findings can be obtained through the analysis. Exploratory and 
statistical analyses were conducted with both point data and polygon data. As mentioned 
earlier, the polygon data was derived from the original point data, because most of 
available tools work for the attributes of polygon data. Therefore, the original terrorist 
events were aggregated to the Philippine province level. 
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6.1.  Mapping Terrorist Events across Provinces 
 
Figure 30. Visualization Methods 
 
Mapping the terrorist events in an exploratory way was first conducted to identify and 
visualize terrorist events patterns. For the Spatial Event Analysis Tool and its ArcMap 
backbone, the aggregated individual terrorist events allowed visualization of the terrorist 
data in graduated symbols, graduated colors, dot density and proportional symbols. These 
visualization methods are simple to use in ArcMap and can portray any field or variable 
that holds numerical data. Examples portrayed include casualty comparisons, increase 
and decrease in events, and portrayal of events by victim, target or tactic type. Figure 30 
depicts four different data visualization methods for total terrorist events in each 
province, between 2004 and 2007. In each of the four methods the capital city of Manila 
is highlighted in the center of the country by a red box. The red box in the south of each 
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map is the area surrounding the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. Both of these 
areas have a high concentration of terrorist attacks: Manila because it is the national 
capital, and Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao because it is rife with conflict as 
the Muslim population vies for autonomy. 
In viewing the four different methods of vizualization, they all protray the same amont of 
information and are based on the same data, but it would appear that the graduated 
symbols method depicts the concentration of terrorist events more prominately. However, 
if the comparison has been depicted at a different resolution or focused on a smaller area, 
than the whole country, a different visualization method may yield more significant 
result. 
6.2.  Point Pattern Analysis of Annual Events 
Although the majority of the analysis occurred with polygon data, one analytical effort 
was attempted with the original point data. In this context, I chose to look into the annual 
events across different periods. The descriptive statistics shows an increase in total 
number of terrorist events from 2002 until 2006 and a slight decline in 2007. There were 
57 events in 2004, 104 terrorist events in 2005, 258 terrorist events in 2006, and 219 
terrorist events in 2007. However, the depiction in Figure 31 goes further in 
demonstrating where the change occurred by portraying all the terrorist events occurring 
in the Philippines for that year. The figure also demonstrates a high terrorist 
concentration around the capital city of Manila (depicted by the red box) and gradual 
increase in events along the eastern and southern portions of the nation.  
Since the patterns shown in Figure 31 suggest a clustering pattern for 2005 and 2006, a 
statistical approach was used to study if the patterns were significantly clustered in those 
years.  
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 Figure 31. Annual Terrorist Events 
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Figure 32. Nearest Neighbor Results 
Besides the visual recognition of point patterns, an average nearest neighbor function was 
also conducted separately for each year, in order to statistically quantify any patterns. By 
conducting nearest neighbor function against each year’s point data the following 
observed mean distance / expected mean distance was identified and depicted in Figure 
32 and Table 7: 
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Table 7. Nearest Neighbor Results 
Year 
Observed Mean 
Distance / Expected 
Mean Distance 
 
Z Score 
2004 0.6 - 5.66 
2005 0.55 - 10.11 
2006 0.4 - 18.48 
2007 0.46 - 15.39 
In each of the observations, the expected mean is greater than the observed mean (the 
ratio is less than 1) and the Z score is a negative number, indicating that the annual events 
are clustered. Further, the  Z score for 2006‘s observation is the smallest, which suggest 
that the event pattern of 2006 departed away from the random pattern the most; the 
terrorist event distribution of 2004 was least significantly different from the random 
patterns among the four years. Put differently, the terrorist events of 2004 were more 
dispersed than the events occurred in another three years. However, it should be noted 
that the limitation of this approach applied in this case study may influence the analysis 
result. The nearest neighbor distance is subject to edge effect and the study area itself. 
Therefore, the practical way to correct these effects is to conduct simulation to compare 
the observed pattern to the simulated random pattern. However, the implementation of 
nearest neighbor distance in ArcGIS does not include a simulation approach and therefore 
it may skew the analysis result by ignoring the true shape and size of Philippine Islands.   
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Besides the nearest neighbor method of mapping terrorist events, the kernel density 
surface is another good exploratory method to visually detect clusters. Figure 33 shows 
an example of a kernel density analysis of casualties in the Philippines because of 
terrorist attacks. The goal of kernel smoothing is to estimate how the density of events 
varies across a study area based on a point pattern. "Kernel estimation was originally 
developed to obtain a smooth estimate of a univariate or multivariate probability density 
from an observed sample of observations..." (Bailey & Gatrell, 1995). In the spatial case, 
Figure 33. Kernel Density of Casualties
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kernel smoothing creates a smooth map of density values in which the density at each 
location reflects the concentration of points in the surrounding area.  
As in previous examples depicting the concentration of terrorists attack, figure 33 
demonstartes that the largest number of casualities occurs where the highest number of 
terrorist attack occurs. In figure 33, the green colors highlight  the areas where the 
greatest number of casualities has occurs. Again, most notabale is the capital city of 
Manila, where based on previous analysis, the most attacks had occurred. 
6.3.  Spatial Autocorrelation 
In conducting spatial autocorrelation to identify patterns, some unique problems were 
encountered with the Philippines. The first problem is the island nature of the country, 
which subsequently separates groups of quadrants (provinces) by the oceans that separate 
the islands. The other problem encountered is the Modifiable Area Unit Problem 
(MAUP) where depending on the size and combination of quadrants may result in 
different clustering aspects. For example, Figure 34 depicts the global Moran’s I for the 
whole of the Philippines based on the province aggregation scheme. In this example, the 
global Moran’s I index was 0.05, leaning towards a clustered pattern as shown in Figure 
34. However, when the area is refined, the global Moran’s I value may change for the 
entire nation. 
 
Figure 34. Philippines Moran's I 
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Further, to compare the regional pattern of terrorist events to the national pattern, the 
Moran’s I can be calculated for a singular island. For example, when the study area 
includes just the islands of Luzon and only those terrorist events conducted by the New 
People Army is taken into account, a different Moran’s I value was generated . As shown 
in Figure 35, the global Moran’s I becomes 0.42 and the Z score indicates a significant 
clustering pattern at p = 0.01. Therefore, compared to the entire nation, the provinces of 
the Luzon islands have an increased clustering pattern of terrorist events. 
 
 
Figure 35. Luzon Moran's I 
While these examples of identifying patterns used global measures for spatial 
autocorrelation and resulted in the identification of overall clustering patterns, an 
additional approach was used in an effort to identify local patterns. For this approach, an 
analysis of local Moran’s I (or LISA maps) was conducted with the same data that was 
used to conduct the global Moran’s I. That data was all terrorist events that occurred in 
the Philippines between 2004 and 2007, or all 674 events. The local approach output is 
shown in Figure 36. 
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Figure 36. Local Moran's I 
 
Figure 36 depicts the Local Moran’s I for the Philippines. In Figure 36, both the I values 
and the Z-scores are used in determining the patterns for the Philippines. Mapping the I 
values shows  the similarity of neighboring provinces in terms of their experience in 
terrorist events and mapping the Z-score shows where local patterns are significant. For 
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example, a local significant negative autocorrelation is found in the capital city Manila, 
suggesting Manila experience much more terrorist events than its neighboring provinces 
(dissimilar to its neighbors).  
To make the interpretation straight forward, it is normal to classify the neighboring 
feature into four categories: HH, HL, LH, or LL. HH represents positive autocorrelation 
of high values in neighboring features; LL also represents autocorrelation of nearby 
features, but it refers to the concentration of low values. Both HL and LH suggest 
negative autocorrelation of neighboring features (dissimilar to each other). Figure 37 
depicts these four types of neighborhood with a significance level at p=0.05. Looking 
into the figure, we find that Manila is a spatial outlier as it significantly differs from its 
neighbors. This spatial outlier was also found in earlier LISA maps (see Figure 36). 
Further, there are two spatial clusters in the map. One is the high concentration of 
terrorist events in the southern part of the country as indicated by the dark red in the map 
(HH neighborhood). This can be explained by the surge in ASG activity and the 
breakdown in government talks with the MILF that occurred during the period of this 
analysis. The other clusters are located in the northern part of the country, but this area 
experienced low terrorist attacks as indicated by the light red (LL neighborhood). It is 
unclear why this low concentration occurred. Another spatial outlier is located along the 
southern edge of the country. However, due to the edge effect and the study area 
disruption by water bodies (and subsequent lack of activity), this spatial outlier may not 
be true. It is also worth emphasizing that further study is necessary in order to be able to 
correctly explain these local patterns, especially those subject to edge effect as they 
cannot be solved with ArcGIS.  
 
Figure 37. Statistically Significant Areas 
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6.4.  Temporal Analysis 
Temporal statistical analysis is difficult to conduct within a GIS. However, some 
exploratory efforts were made. The first thing that was segregated was yearly samples of 
data for a particular terrorist group. In this case, that was the New People’s Army, and a 
geographic region of Luzon was defined for each year. Four separate Shapefiles were 
produced, for 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively. Subsequently, directional 
distribution was produced for each year. The annual layering and subsequent output is 
depicted in Figure 38. 
 
Figure 38. Temporal Analysis 
Using the standard deviation tool for each year and evaluating the subsequent ellipse, a 
directional deviation of the annual events was identified. The annual deviation is 
portrayed as the locations and directions of the ellipse change. Evaluating the first year 
standard deviation (2004), portrayed in red; a standard ellipse in the center of the island 
chain was identified. The 2005 ellipse is portrayed in gray, and demonstrates northern 
distribution of terrorist events. 2006, portrayed in green and 2007, which is portrayed in 
blue, demonstrate a southeastern distribution of terrorist event along the island. These 
patterns indicate a change in pattern of the New People Army. Specifically, the analysis 
shows a change in the area of operation, but also the directional shift in influence over the 
four years of the sample. 
 76
7. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
For Army an experiment, a GIS, using open sources and  complimented by a set of 
analytical tools, such as those in the SEAT, assists in understanding contemporary 
adversaries. The SEAT proved useful in analysis of terrorist events and will benefit U.S. 
Army experiments. Because the data used by the SEAT is derived from open sources, 
scenario participants will have some familiarity with the terrorist organizations and the 
events they conduct. This provides a high degree of realism for experiment participants. 
Additionally, because open source is used, greater participation  in war games can occur 
because the data is not derived from classified sources.  
The overall goal of the project to provide a realistic and accurate visualization of 
terrorist groups and the many events they conduct was achieved. Additionally, the 
objective to spatially depict the activities of different terrorist organizations by 
means of generalized locations, like those found in a newspaper, was also 
successfully fulfilled. Using spatial analytical tools in ArcGIS, the Spatial Event 
Analysis Tool is able to identify spatial patterns and changes in the patterns of 
terrorist activities. For example, terrorist areas of operations, areas of terrorist 
influence, how terrorists operate, and whether an organization’s area is growing 
can be examined with the SEAT. 
There are considerations and challenges to the SEAT. Expandability of the project 
is possible and the NCTC maintains data for many countries that are affected by 
terrorism. Unfortunately, gaining an appreciation of terrorist activity over time is 
challenged by this data, as NCTC only focuses on the years 2004 to 2007. 
Additionally, as other countries data are added to the SEAT’s database, a more 
thorough database design must be considered. The addition of other information, 
such as demographic, social, and financial data, should also be considered in an 
expanded database design. 
The spatial and statistical tools of the SEAT were quite informative, but their 
output is also not without consideration. Primarily, the pattern identification used 
in the project could not tell why a pattern had occurred. Additional data 
(demographic, social, and financial) can assist in resolving this issue by applying 
regression analysis to find out relationships between the terrorist activity and 
other factors. In doing so, more insight of terrorist events can be obtained. 
Further, edge effects, as previously mentioned, were a concern for the Philippines 
and will be a concern for other archipelago nations, as well as those nations that 
share land borders. 
The SEAT is expected to be integrated into U.S. Army experiments. The most significant 
of these is TRADOC’s capstone annual experiment, which is conducted at the behest of 
the Chief of Staff of the Army. The experiment involves thousands of people from many 
industrial, foreign, academic, and government agencies and addresses whether or not the 
U.S. Army and the United States have the potential to contend with evolving threats over 
the next three to fifteen years. Terrorism is sure to figure prominently, today and in the 
future. 
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Future work worthy of consideration includes expansion of the SEAT to include regional 
information. Using the framework of the SEAT to address terrorist activity at the regional 
level, such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia, or Central Asia, is the next logical step in 
the evolution of the SEAT. Expanding the project would also challenge some of the 
considerations brought forth in this paper, such as database design, additional statistical 
methods, and interpretation of results. 
Additionally, integration of the SEAT with Covey’s Social Network Analysis 
Application would also add significant depth to Army experiments. The ability to link 
multiple terrorist organizations and their subsequent relationship to a terrorist event is 
seen as extremely beneficial to Army experiments, as well as Army decision makers. For 
example, if a terrorist event is conducted by the Aby Sayyef Group, and the group’s 
subsequent relationship to Jemaah Islamiyah, and subsequent relationship to Al Qaeda 
can be visualized, tremendous value for interdiction of the groups can be realized by the 
Army, in both Army experiments and during actual operations. 
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Appendix A: Coding Scheme for Terrorist Events 
 
File Name of the Data File:  terrorist_spreadsheet.xls 
 
________________________________________________________________________
Field Name  Field Type Width Dec  Index Variable Label 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Event   Integer  7    Y Event ID number 
Country  String   5    N Country of event 
State/Province             String      N Secondary location of  
Event 
 City   String      N Primary location of  
         event 
 Location  Lat/Long     N Geocode location of  
         event 
 Tactic   Integer  1    Y Type of tactic 
 
Code    Tactic  
      1 Armed Attack 
      2 Arson 
      3 Assassination 
      4 Bombing 
       5 Kidnapping 
      6 Theft 
      7  Unknown 
 
  Weapon  Integer  1   Y Weapon used in event 
Code    Weapon 
      1 Explosive 
      2 Firearm 
      3 Grenade 
      4 IED 
       5 Landmine 
      6 other 
      7 RPG 
      8 unknown 
 
Victim Type  Integer  1 Y Victim of event 
 
Code   Victim   
      1 Business 
      2 Civilian 
      3 Civilian / Police 
      4 Police 
       5 Politian 
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       6 none 
       7 Military  
       8 NGO 
       9 none 
  
 Casualties   Integer  5 Y Casualties of event 
 Death   Integer  5 Y Deaths caused by event  
 Wounded  Integer  5 Y Wounded caused by event 
 Hostage  Integer  4 Y Hostages taken  
 Associated Group String  >1 Y Group conducting event 
 
Code   Associated Group  
 MILF  Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
 ASG  Abu Sayyef Group 
 NPA-CPP New People’s Army – Communist Party of the Philippines 
 Pentagon Pentagon Group 
 ABB  Alex Boncayao Brigade 
 JI  Jemaah Islamiyah 
 HMB  Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan 
 Unknown 
 
Claim Responsibility Binary  1 Y Claim of responsibility for  
     event 
 U.S. Attack  Binary  1 Y Was victim U.S. affiliated 
 Summary  String  >1 N Summary of Event 
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Appendix B: Functional Requirements Identifier 
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